Sartre’s Magical Being
An Introduction by Way of an Example

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ABSTRACT: Sartrean conceptions of the Ego, emotions, language, and the imaginary provide a comprehensive account of “magic” that could ultimately give rise to a new philosophical psychology. By focusing upon only one of these here—the imaginary—we see that through its irrealizing capabilities consciousness contaminates the world and bewitches itself in a manner that defies simple deterministic explication. We highlight this with an explication of what Sartre means by “nihilation” and the “analogon,” and introduce a concrete example of nostalgia, hoping to lay the scene for a detailed study into the dynamic between our ontological freedom and its constitution and experience of phenomena as enchanting and bewitching. “Magical being” must therefore involve a deep, Sartrean analysis that explicates ontological freedom as becoming concretely engaged in both the real and irreal alike, whereby the imaginary as magic can lead to the most insane, as well as the most artistic, incantations.

KEYWORDS: Sartre, magic, nihilation, analogon, imaginary, nostalgia.

There seem to be four different, though closely interrelated, conceptions of “magic” within Sartre’s early philosophical writings. Firstly, the ego is a “degraded and bastard spontaneity” (Sartre 1972b: 81) of pure consciousness that “magically preserves its creative power even while becoming passive,” thereby allowing consciousness to imprison itself in a way that tries to flee or protect itself from its own pure spontaneity. Secondly, emotions are magical in that consciousness, through “degrading itself” (Sartre 1976: 78) into “bodily incantations” (73), tries to either transform a brutally deterministic state of affairs through an “irrational synthesis of spontaneity and passivity” (85); or, in an opposite movement, an unexpected turn of events in the world, instigated by an Other, can
surprise consciousness in an equally unforeseen, and hence magical, manner (84). Thirdly, language for a listener is always magical, says Sartre in Being and Nothingness, because although the listener is always aware of the freedom behind my words and gestures, they can never grasp this freedom themselves, and thus can never truly predict what the I might do or say next (Sartre 2005: 396). Finally, the imaginary as such may be said to be magical because consciousness has the astounding capacity to irrealize reality in a manner that invokes an imaginary state that may contaminate and bewitch that same reality. It is this latter Sartrean form of magic that I will focus upon, while at the same time hoping to show that such analysis immediately demands further investigations into the other related forms of Sartrean “magic” – because we can already see that “magic” in general may be defined as that non-logical, non-deterministic capacity of consciousness to transform itself and the world in which it exists into states and scenarios that defy strict causal determinism, thereby invoking thoughts and manners of being that are truly spontaneous and literally “enchanting.”

In order to explain this more systematically, my paper will consist of four stages. First, I will briefly describe consciousness as a constitutive upsurge in the manner of an “original nihilation” (Sartre 2005: 33-34). Secondly, using a very famous example, I will highlight the fact that through consciousness’s capacity to experience absence, a gateway is opened up to the imaginary as such. Thirdly, I will show that such a “gateway” is only fully realized through a second species of (double) nihilation that is heavily reliant upon what Sartre calls the analogon. Finally, using my own example of nostalgia, I will show how this whole process can culminate in “magical being.”

As an original ontological upsurge, being-for-itself constitutes both a world and a self. This is because being-for-itself “is what it is not and is not what it is” (Sartre 2005: 142) in the sense that because consciousness has an irreducible nihilative structure that perpetually “secretes nothingness,” there always exists a world that consciousness is not, as well as a “self” (viz. a past) that consciousness no longer is. In this manner consciousness relates, ontologically, to the world and its own self through a constant and constitutive nihilative act that makes it be what it is not (the world) in the manner of already not being what it is (its own immediate past). This is the fundamental structure of consciousness as freedom—i.e. as (double) nihilation—in that it is the incessant process of inserting nothingness into being, both into the world and its own self. In contradistinction
to being-in-itself, therefore, which “is what it is” in the manner of absolute coincidence, brute contingency, and “full positivity” (22), being-for-itself “is what it is not and is not what it is” in the manner that it is always split from the world and itself by precisely—nothing. An absolute prerequisite of consciousness as such is therefore non-coincidence – in fact, freedom, anguish, bad faith, intentionality etc. etc. can all be viewed as so many aspects of this fundamental nihilative structure of non-coincidence.⁴

Taking a step further, consciousness is, as we have said, this activity of original nihilation. The nihilative act constitutes a world (and a past) through the very act of “secreting nothingness.” Put more plainly, the world can only appear as an ever-changing “ground” for consciousness precisely if consciousness is not this ground. This is a fundamental prerequisite for intentionality, whereby the nihilative activity of consciousness constitutes a general ground from out of which consciousness can be conscious of some particular thing. A very famous Sartrean example highlights this point: when I look for Pierre in a café, the café is automatically constituted as a “ground” (33) out of which objects arise through the direction of my gaze, with each individual figure then being “thrown back to nothingness” (35) when I realize that they are not what I’m looking for—Pierre. If Pierre is in fact there, I would be “suddenly arrested by his face and the whole café would organize itself around him as a discrete presence” (34). However Pierre is not there, and once I have searched the whole café this place as such is nihilated in a second moment, whereby I have seen that the café doesn’t contain Pierre. In other words, I experience Pierre’s absence “from the whole café” (34).

Consciousness as a double nihilation in normal, pre-reflective perceptual events therefore gives us the inherent capacity to experience absence, which, I will argue, is a necessary prerequisite for a second species of double nihilation, one which allows us access into that second main realm of human existence, namely the imaginary. In this realm, absence is not simply experienced but is invoked in a manner that transfigures reality precisely through irrealizing it. Additionally, this can occur in such a way as to contaminate that reality under the rubric of magic. Extending upon Sartre’s own example, we may say that after I have left the café, while walking down the street, I start to wonder where Pierre is, and hereby I may imagine him on a bus. In an instant, I invoke the image of Pierre-on-a-bus while I am walking down the street. Because Sartre calls the imaginary magical as such,⁵ this rather mundane example is “magical” in the sense that it is the instant, unpredictable creation of Pierre-on-a-bus by my con-
sciousness—in other words it is “magic” in the sense that there is no necessary, causal link between where Pierre might actually be and where I’ve imagined him being. The real and the imaginary necessarily exclude each other. Additionally, such an imaginary act is a spontaneous creation of my consciousness that has no real necessary link with my very real act of walking, though it does, in this case at least, have a loose causal link to the preceding events (namely looking for Pierre in the café and not finding him). Yet, this highlights the second vital point, namely, that though the real and the irreal “necessarily exclude one another,” the irreal always arises through *irrealizing the real*. Further, this “irrealization” can come about in such a manner that the real becomes *contaminated* with the irreal, which I would argue is a magical act proper, for in more mundane imaginary acts, the real is not contaminated in this way. “Magical” hereby can be understood as positing the irreal in this world to such an extent that this world becomes contaminated through its own irrealization.

So, although all imaginary experiences always have at least some element of the magical, the magical varies depending upon the *force* of the imaginary experience under consideration. In other words, imaginary consciousness has different *levels of intensities* that *transfigure* the world to greater and lesser extents. Considering this, imagining Pierre-on-a-bus is, in comparison to other examples, an extremely tame form of the magical. This is because although any act of imagination necessarily involves an *irrealization* of the world as such, “magic,” in its strong form, involves those cases of imagining where the world as a whole, in its own turn, becomes bewitched through the imaginary act. Imagining Pierre-on-a-bus is “tame” because consciousness simply imagines Pierre for an instant and then “lets it go,” with little or no “contamination” of my walking (unless I become so consumed that I walk into something!). A stronger form of magic then is an imaginary act that *transfixes* consciousness to such an extent that the world is flooded and distorted by the imaginary act itself. Although there can be no clear dividing line between “stronger” and “tamer” forms, a stronger example will highlight this difference more clearly.

Before giving such an example, I will first outline the general structure of the imaginary, in contradistinction to perception. First of all, Sartre says it is one thing to *perceive* that an arabesque continues behind a cupboard, and another to *imagine* what the arabesque behind the cupboard may actually look like. In the first case it is quite clear, Sartre says, that there is always, in any given perception, an “emptily intended” project of perceiving that continues beyond
the actually given content of the present perception. In other words, there always exist elements that are not actually perceived in the present moment but are nevertheless always implicitly implied—and they can always, if we so choose, be perceived (for example, by looking behind the cupboard). This is completely in line with Husserl, with the underside of an ashtray on a desk being one of Sartre’s examples (Sartre 2007: 121). And to return to the arabesque, it means that if I perceive only half an arabesque on a wall with the other half hidden behind the cupboard, I automatically have an “empty intention” of the hidden half in the one and the same perceptual act of the visible half. Such empty intentions have their basis in our knowledge, Sartre says, whose source lies either in memory, or in “unformulated”—i.e. “antepredicative”—inferences. But our knowledge plays a vital role in imaginary consciousness too—it is one of our main tools for forming what Sartre calls the “analogon,” this latter being the physical, psychical, and/or psycho-physical material imagining consciousness uses to form its image. So wherein lies the difference between how knowledge is used in perception and how it is used in the imagination?

To give a preliminary answer, we may first state that in imaginary consciousness, my act of positing the arabesque behind the cupboard radically excludes any “emptily intended” perception of it; in an instant, I create an imaginary state whereby I both make explicit and degrade my (empty) perception in a totally spontaneous act that posits the arabesque behind the cupboard in a complete though irreal (i.e. “impoverished”) manner (Sartre 2007: 122). Sartre talks here of the “degraded” and “impoverished” in imaginary acts in the sense that in perception, consciousness, through empty intentions, is always open to learning more about its object. By contrast, in imaginary consciousness, “empty intentions” are excluded by definition, meaning the image, once formed, is based solely upon the knowledge one already has of it (from memory and/or “unformulated inferences”). This means there is no space for developing or learning from an image, and it is a “degraded” form of consciousness in that it is “impoverished” of the possibility of improvement or enrichment. To “improve” the image would be to nihilate the present one entirely and reformulate it in an entirely new one that has been adjusted through further knowledge, accrued either from further perceptions and/or different mnemonic information and inferences.

Thus, in imaginary consciousness I do not “emptily intend” the arabesque behind the wall but “see” it through my imaginary consciousness of it. Perception and the imaginary therefore necessarily
exclude one another; in fact they are “the two great irreducible attitudes of consciousness” (Sartre 2007: 120). This also means that perception and “the magical” also exclude each other, but only in a certain sense – for I will argue that “magic” entails precisely those cases where the absolute distinction between reality and irreality becomes blurred. To make initial sense of this apparent contradiction, we must divide the irrealization involved in “magic” into two “moments.” Reality must be totally irrealized if an imaginary act is to occur at all – this is the first moment. But an imaginary act can also become truly magical when it, in its own turn, infiltrates what has been irrealized to the extent that the irreal becomes present and dominant in this world – i.e. in the real. “Magic” thus means to live one’s imaginary act “before one’s very eyes,” to such an extent that one’s whole present situation becomes thoroughly enchanted and consciousness becomes, in Sartre’s words, so “fascinated” by the “magical” image that it is “caught in its own snare” (Sartre 1976: 76-77, 80). To highlight these crucial points more fully, I need to first explicate how the absolute transition from the perceptive to the imaginary attitude is possible as such; and then how “magic” may make this distinction blurred in its own turn. The first part of the answer lies, I would argue, in a second moment or act of double nihilation, and the concomitant construction of what Sartre calls the “analogon.” The second part I will illuminate through an example of my own—nostalgia.

The irreal, just like the real, rests upon a “double nothingness: nothingness of itself in relation to the world, nothingness of the world in relation to it” (Sartre 2007: 186). In other words, the irreal always necessarily presupposes a nihilation of the real worldly situation in which one is present in order to then posit something as irreal—i.e. as either inexistent, absent, “existing elsewhere,” or “neutralizing” the notion of existence altogether (12). We have tried to show that such irrealizations presuppose our more mundane ability to experience absence as such, as was the case with Pierre. By performing a second species of double nihilation—an “imaginary” one—one goes beyond the original perceptual experience of absence in that consciousness now invokes absence, imports it by irrealizing reality spontaneously. That is, consciousness neutralizes reality so as to be indifferent to its status qua reality, and at the very same moment it incants an imaginary state which is itself “a nothing” in relation to that same reality. Such a process is only possible through the analogon, which is the “material” that imaginary consciousness uses to condense aspects of the world in order to create its image.
Such “material,” whether physical, psychical, or psycho-physical, is therefore used to make an object present that is essentially inexist-ent or absent (Sartre 2007: 18). One must always remember that whether I perceive or imagine Pierre, both forms of consciousness ultimately have the same object—Pierre. In perception, Pierre is given there, in the flesh, and therefore has no need of an analogon. In the image, however, Pierre is made present as absent. Here the analogon plays the vital role because it provides the physical (e.g. a picture of Pierre), psychical (knowledge of Pierre), and/or psycho-physical (a feeling for Pierre) material required for rendering present what is absent.

The analogon needn’t be made up of one specific type of analogical “material” however, but on the contrary there more often than not exists “a plurality of differentiated qualities in the analogon” (85). Although such “qualities” as knowledge, movement, affectivity etc. can be distinguished in the abstract through philosophical analysis, in the actual imaginative act, such “aspects” form the analogon entirely, once and for all, each and every time, in the “unity of the same [imaginative] consciousness” (137). The analogon therefore neutralizes or modifies aspects of reality (first aspect of nihilation) so consciousness can then use this material to invoke its imaginary state (second aspect). My own example of nostalgia, which is similar to one given by Sartre in La Nausée, will help demonstrate what has been said more concretely.

I am a long way from home, and have been for some time. I have not settled properly into my new environment, have made few friends and everything, in general, seems a bit strange. In my free time I wander around aimlessly, seeking I’m not quite sure what. My mind often wanders back to past joys and events from home, and I can’t quite seem to be able to forget that I’m no longer there. My present environment is tainted with a deep yearning for home; I am suffering from nostalgia. Then, one evening, I am sitting in a café drinking a glass of wine when a song comes on the radio, and I’m instantly transported. Through the song, I immediately have the image of sitting at home with a good friend, sharing a beer, and listening to this song—those were good times, and I miss them, the image evokes. I get uncomfortable with this vision and get up, abandoning my wine in a vague manner, until the waitress calls for me to not leave without paying. Her interruption brings me back to this place with a crash; the image evaporates although the song still plays, and I am left with a rather bitter taste in my mouth. I pay the girl and leave.
What is happening here? Well it is clear that I am homesick, and although everything seems vague and strange in this foreign place, under a Sartrean framework of freedom I am just as capable of assuming such facts differently than in the manner of a general nostalgia. However, the moment a familiar song comes on, instantaneously reminding me of home, I am transported into the realm of the imaginary proper. How is this done? Well, in my more mundane nostalgia (wandering around aimlessly etc.), I was everywhere experiencing that this place was not my home—my home was absent from this whole place just like Pierre was absent from the whole café. Thus, my nostalgia as such seems to rest upon experiencing absence as such—the absence of the place where I’d rather be. The song, however, which is very much real, acts as a trigger that seems to have a power almost of its own, in that it instantly transports me onto the irreal plane in the full sense: through the song, my knowledge and affection for home are awakened in a manner that allows the café in which I am sitting to be irrealized to the extent that an image of me and my friend having a beer and listening to this same song at home is evoked. The song therefore seems to possess a magical power that is immediately taken up into an analogon, along with my knowledge and affection for home, thereby incanting an imaginary state that fills me with a sweet melancholic feeling in the very place I am sitting. But the sweetness doesn’t last long, and while still imagining, I decide to try and flee the rather more unsettling elements of my imaginary consciousness. Still being captivated, however, I am only brought back to this world in all its brutal reality through the call of the waitress who, quite understandably, wants me to pay for my wine.

This example is therefore twofold: nostalgia in its more general form was a basic dissatisfaction with the place I was in—I walked around aimlessly, constituting each area as a ground upon which I claimed, in a second implicit moment, “this is not my home.” Building upon this general attitude, an imaginary experience proper then transported me, in an almost involuntary manner, onto the imaginary plane. Here my real surroundings were neutralized in a way that allowed consciousness to take up aspects of them into an analogon, which then immediately incanted an image that contaminated my given situation to the extent that only the reprimand of the waitress brought me back a normal perceptual level. I hope to have shown that this is a “stronger” magical example than simply imagining Pierre-on-a-bus, for the image here is incanted in a manner that contaminates the world in such a manner that I completely lose my orientation – in fact, through the song, the world and the imaginary
nothingness I secrete over it (which selects the aspects I wish to form my image) become very convoluted indeed. This differs from the more straightforward example of imagining Pierre on a bus, because in the latter the world and my image remain clearly defined, even though the world is totally unrealized – “put on the back burner,” so to speak. Indeed, all imaginary acts are “magical” in the sense that a prerequisite for the imaginary as such is a spontaneous unrealization of the world; but the “strongly” magical is when such unrealization is projected into one’s given situation to such an extent that the lines become blurred, and consciousness merges with things such as a song. For in my nostalgia example, the song is certainly playing, here and now – and yet it is also playing, through my unrealizing consciousness, at home, in the past.

The “magical” in this example, therefore, involves a kind of force that triggers the invocation of an image and completely pollutes any normal perception of the world and its objects. As I have implied, depending upon the given experience and situation, such “magic” can have greater or lesser intensities. Firstly, it is quite evident that we can walk down the street while imagining someone on a bus with little trouble – the “lines” are clearly defined, although the walking is “automatic.” But in our nostalgia example, which is of relatively high magical intensity, there seems to be an incantation that is so strong that it prevents any real action or appraisal of my normal, perceptual being-in-the-world. Both cases have the same structure – unrealization of the real – and both are “magical” in this “tamer” sense. However, imagining Pierre-on-a-bus is an imaginary act that seems not to be triggered by anything immediately perceived (like the song), and it is not “magical” in the stronger sense because the image evoked “leaves the world well alone.” In the nostalgia example, there is a close though non-necessary link between my general yearning for home and the more explicit imaginary consciousness evoked by such a yearning. This is also of the same fundamental structure as not finding Pierre in the café and then imagining him on a bus. However, in the latter case, my imagining Pierre-on-a-bus seems to be a spontaneous, almost frivolous creation of my own that has nothing to do with my activity of walking, whereas in the nostalgia example it seems that it is the song that I am listening to that triggers the whole imaginary process, and around which the process gravitates entirely. This means imaginary consciousness in this instance is instilled in the world where the song is really playing and in which my activity of listening takes place, like
a superimposed layer of irreality that completely contaminates that which it irrealizes.

Indeed, although the pre-reflective experience of absence on the perceptual level is an absolute prerequisite for the imaginary to be possible as such, just how or what one imagines at any given moment is a very curious topic, with our nostalgia example hinting that the “magical” may often involve a special force inhereing in particular phenomena, which then trigger imaginary states in an almost involuntary way. Are they put there by our ontological freedom? Or are there qualities of phenomena that go beyond our spontaneous control? The trigger or epicenter in our example was the song, and it definitely forms a vital part of the analogon. But the song also raises the question whether there are certain phenomena in our lives that possess a force that seem to challenge the apparently absolute spontaneity of our imaginary creations.

Moreover, what if we extended this last suggestion even further? Sartre states that individuals may be arranged into “two great categories” (Sartre 2007: 146)—those where the real, perceptual attitude predominates; and those where the imaginary, irrealizing one does. Psychotics would certainly be a class of the second category, along with artists and what Sartre calls “morbid dreamers” (our nostalgic may fit in this latter category). These individuals, Sartre says, prefer the imaginary in its totality (147), meaning there is a complete predominance of the irreal over the real, whereby the real is almost always already irrealized through psychical incantations, emotions, artistic creations, etc. However, in the light our example, what does this mean? Is it that such individuals freely and constantly bewitch themselves in order for the real to be perpetually enchanted? Or does it mean that the phenomena have somehow accrued (perhaps initially through a form of paranoiac projection) a magical power of their own, meaning reality or elements of it become so enchanted that one can no longer relate to them in a more “sober” light? Perhaps these are two sides of the same coin. Indeed, given Sartre’s adherence to intentionality, it seems likely that an answer lies in a dynamic study that views magical phenomena and consciousness thereof as closely and complexly intertwined. Because a magical experience means entering into the magical realm as such, if such an attitude becomes sustained and predominant, then all objects in that world are then constituted as already possessing certain magical qualities.

To go in another, though related, direction, I would also suggest that as consciousness lives its spontaneity in the world, it becomes
tied to things and phenomena in a manner that although initially freely constituted, such phenomena at the very same time may go on to constrict and bewitch our ontological spontaneity in a Proustian manner of *souvenir involontaire*. Indeed, what Breeur calls *la singularité* may be expressed here in terms that, while consciousness lives its world, *traces* of it are left in that same world, which like the facticity and contingency of being-in-itself, can come to “haunt” and “possess” that same consciousness (Breeur 2005: 298). This is “magic” once again, for it is the (free?) capacity of consciousness to leave irreal traces of itself in the world, traces which then can “magically surprise” the very same consciousness that left them. In this manner, though nihilative, consciousness, *qua* singularity, *overflows itself* through magical incantations and projections that make it relate to itself as a past and as in the world in a way that is thoroughly bewitching.

Such a conception of Sartrean magic would obviously need to investigate all its forms in much more detail, so they might be incorporated into a more general theory. Suffice it to conclude here by saying that many of our psychical acts possess some element of the magical, which irrealizes, to a greater or lesser extent, our given situation in a manner that cannot be explained or predicted by any simple kind of psychological determinism. On the contrary, we have seen that through consciousness’s ability to experience absence in the perceptual world, a gateway is opened up to an imaginary realm whereby we can be bewitched by psychical incantations that possess an almost infinite array of possibility, from the most incomprehensible outputs of a schizophrenic to the most famous works of art.

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Notes

1. “Passive” meaning an object for consciousness. Consciousness actively “intends” its object, the object therefore being passive in relation to this activity of intending.

2. These are the two aspects of magic that a recent article by Sarah Richmond seems to focus on. She calls the first form the “dominant line of thought” (Richmond 2011: 151), whereby a single consciousness, always in bad faith, tries to escape a deterministic state of affairs in the world through attempting to transform it through bodily incantations (viz. emotions). This is the “dominant line of thought” because it takes up most of Sartre’s *Sketch*, as well as the fact that it has precursors in Lévy-Bruhl, Bergson, Alain, and Freud. The second, “innovative line of thought” (153), concerns the last few pages of the *Sketch* and forms the precursor of what will be “the look” (*le regard*) in *Being and Nothingness*. Here, another consciousness instils magic in the world and “in” my consciousness through its own capacity to act and affect me in a way that I cannot predict and that is therefore not subject to deterministic laws either. This is that “action across a distance” (154) that becomes the look in its most fully-fledged form, whereby inter-human relations always have an element of the magical. (145-160.)

3. Language for the speaker, on the other hand, is “sacred,” meaning my words and gestures are always aimed at another freedom (transcendence) that I, in my own turn, cannot properly grasp; my words and gestures go beyond a simple objective manifestation in the concrete world, in that they can be observed and taken up by others in a manner that goes beyond my own (immediate) comprehension (Sartre 2005: 395-396). Obviously, this is closely related to Richmond’s claim that “the look” in general always has magical aspects, with language forming one of the seven fundamental “concrete relations with others” in which the look immediately instantiates itself (Sartre 2005: 386-434).

4. This vital Sartrean distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself is already quite apparent at the very beginning of his very earliest (philosophical) work – (see Sartre 1972a: 1-6).

6. One of Husserl’s examples in his *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* (Husserl 2001: 64-65) concerns the discussion of the first “modalisation” of “disappointment” (*Enttäuschung*), whereby, when viewing one side or “aspect” (*Abschattung*) of a red ball, one has the empty expectation (*Erwartung*) that the other side too will be spherical and red, although it turns out, in “disappointment,” to be indented and green.

7. A fuller explication of what Sartre means by the analogon will follow shortly.

8. A painting, a photo, an actor, etc. These are all dealt with, amongst many others, in great detail by Sartre, in what he calls the Image Family (Sartre 2007: 17-53).


10. Such as “affectivity” or “kinaesthetic sensations” (Sartre 2007: 68-83).

11. “‘When the mellow moon begins to beam/Every night I dream a little dream’. La voix, grave et rauque, apparaît brusquement et le monde s’évanouit, le monde des existences. Une femme de chair a eu cette voix, elle a chanté devant un disque, dans sa plus belle toilette et l’on enregistrerait sa voix. La femme : bah ! elle existait comme moi, comme Rollebon, je n’ai pas envie de la connaître. Mais il y a ça. On ne peut pas dire que cela existe. Le disque qui tourne existe, l’air frappé par la voix, qui vibre, existe, la voix qui impressionna le disque existe. Moi qui écoute, j’existe. Tout est plein, l’existence partout, dense et lourde et douce. Mais, par-delà toute cette douceur, inaccessible, toute proche, si loin hélas, jeune, impitoyable et sereine il y a cette… rigueur.” (Sartre 1981: 122.)

12. Such “general” nostalgia seems to involve magic *qua* emotion, if not the imaginary, for it seems such nostalgia is the general wish to (magically) transform this place I am actually in for the one I would prefer to be in. Such emotion, called “affectivity” in *The Imaginary*, then goes into forming a vital part of the analogon, already showing how the different types/forms of Sartrean magic are closely interlinked.

13. Hence Sartre’s fascination with such “imaginary” beings, particularly literary artists (Flaubert, Genet, Baudelaire, etc.).


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**Works Cited**


